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Boyer and Barton: Writ of Prohibition in Florida Since 1951

WRIT OF PROHIBITION IN FLORIDA SINCE 1951
TYRm A. BoYrR*
JAmES M. BARTON, II**

Over the last 25 years, most areas of Florida law have undergone substantial, if not radical, changes. However, one aspect which has remained
relatively static is the remedy of prohibition. In a previous article,1 the
authors discussed the history, scope, and procedure of the writ of prohibition
in Florida and considered every Florida case pertaining to prohibition as of
1951. We will not therefore in this article reiterate the significant points
discussed in the prior article, but we will endeavor to note the ways in which
the writ of prohibition has been modified and note the additional situations
in which prohibition has been found to be an appropriate remedy. In order
to avoid needless repetition, extensive reference will be made to the prior
article. Our conclusions are based upon examination of every Florida case
on the subject since 1951. While every case will not be cited, those that
are relevant and significant will be listed and, if helpful analytically, discussed
in some detail.
LEGAL BASIs

2

The Florida Constitution empowers the supreme court, 3 the district courts
of appeal,4 and the circuit courts5 to issue writs of prohibition. Procedure
is governed by both statute and court rule. 7 The substantive law concerning
prohibition continues to be shaped by the decisional law of the courts.
CHARACTEMSTI.s

The key word in any case involving the writ of prohibition has historically
been and still is "jurisdiction." When a lower tribunal threatens to act
without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, issuance of the writ is
proper.9 Prohibition remains a discretionary writ, 10 and the writ will not
*B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1954, J.D. 1967, University of Florida; Chief Judge, First District

Court of Appeal, Florida.
**B.A. 1971, Tulane University, J.D. 1974, Vanderbilt University.
1. Wehle & Belcher, Prohibition in Florida, U. FiA. L. REv. 546 (1951).
2. For history and former legal basis in Florida, see Wehle & Belcher, supra note 1,
at 546-47.
3. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3(b)(4).
4. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4(b)(3).
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, §5(b).
6.

FLA. STAT. § §81.011 et seq. (1975).

7.

FLA. App. R. 4.5(a), (d).

8. See Wehie & Belcher, supra note 1, at 547-50, for a thorough discussion of the
principal qualities of prohibition.

9. State ex rel. Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Taylor, 104 So. 2d 745 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1958).
10. State ex rel. Fla. Real Estate Comm'n v. Anderson, 164 So. 2d 265 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1964).
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issue where the petitioner is protected by another adequate remedy at law."
Since the writ is preventive rather than remedial, the writ will not issue
12
when the action that is sought to be prohibited has already occurred.
Prohibition is readily distinguishable from other extraordinary writs, such
as certiorari, 1" mandamus, 14 and quo warranto. 15 If the reviewing court
determines that a different extraordinary writ is more appropriate under the
circumstances, it may, in its discretion, treat the suggestion for writ of prohibition as a petition for the more appropriate writ. 16
A recent supreme court opinion defined prohibition as:
[tihat process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or
tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exceeding its
jurisdiction in matters over which it has cognizance or usurping jurisdiction over matters not within its jurisdiction to hear and determine. 17
SCOPE' S
While prohibition is available as a remedy in civil and criminal cases, it
has been applied to relatively few situations. In order to establish a prima
facie case, a relator must establish that the inferior tribunal intends to act
in excess of or without jurisdiction. 19 When the allegations of a suggestion
for writ of prohibition state a prima facie case, the court will issue a rule
directing the inferior tribunal to show cause by a day certain why the writ
as prayed for should not issue. If the respondent (inferior tribunal) fails
to file a return (response) within the prescribed period, the writ of prohibition
will issue based only upon the prima facie allegations in the suggestion. 20
If the suggestion fails to allege a prima facie case no rule will be issued,
2
no return is required, and the suggestion will be denied. "
A prevalent use of prohibition in recent years has been to enforce the
provisions of the speedy trial rule. 22 Issuance of the writ has been held
proper even where the speedy trial issue had not been raised in the trial

11. Corbin v. State ex rel. Slaughter, 324 So. 2d 203 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1975). See also
the discussion in Wehle 9:BeIcher, supra note 1, at 548-50.
12. State ex rel. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Boyd, 114 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1959); State
ex rel. West Flagler Assoc., Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents, 238 So. 2d 677 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
13. State ex rel. Wainwright v. Booth, 291 So. 2d 74 (2d D.C.A.) cert. discharged, 300
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1974).
14. Wincor v. Turner, 215 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1968).
15. State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164 (Ist D.C.A. 1964), aff'd, 178 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1965).
16. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. McIntosh, 322 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975)
(suggestion for writ of prohibition treated as petition for conflict certiorari).
17. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1974).
18. See Wehle & Belcher, supra note 1, at 550-56.
19. State v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952); State v. Taylor, 104 So. 2d 745 (Ist
D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
20. FLA. App. R. 4.5(d); Turner v. Olliff, 281 So. 2d 384 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
21. State ex rel. Hanemann v. Wingfield, 202 So. 2d 131 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
22.

FLA. R. CRIM. PRAc. 3.191.
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court. 23 Prohibition is appropriate in cases where a defendant is charged with
2s
either a felony 24 or misdemeanor.
Another area of criminal law into which prohibition has expanded since
1951 is double jeopardy.26 Since the supreme court set the example in 1956,27
every district court of appeal has applied prohibition in cases asserting double
2
jeopardy. 8
Defendants in criminal cases have frequently attempted to seek relief via
prohibition from alleged irregularities in the conduct of grand juries. Those
efforts have met with mixed results. The courts have uniformly held that
prohibition may not be employed even on a showing that unauthorized persons
were present in the grand jury room. 29 When an accused is charged by indictment or information with a crime for which he should have received immunity, 3° he may petition for a writ of prohibition. 1 Relief may also be
granted where a circuit court judge threatens to take unauthorized action
regarding the grand jury,32 and where an accused is charged by indictment
or information based on an unconstitutional statute purporting to extend
3
the jurisdiction of the courts or to grant new jurisdiction. 3
Prohibition lies to secure disqualification of a judge. 4 Once there is a
23. State ex rel. Neville v. Goodman, 254 So. 2d 55 (3d D.CA. 1971), cert. denied,
261 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1972).
24. State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (lst D.CA. Fla. 1975).
25. State ex tel. Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
26. See Wehle & Belcher supra note 1, at 553, where the authors note that the case
law of Florida, with one exception, had declined to apply prohibition to pleas of double
jeopardy.
27. State ex rel. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1956). See also Strawn v.
State ex rel. Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976).
28. State ex tel. Anderberg v. Strawn, 307 So. 2d 213 (4th D.C.A. 1975) (the
court summarized the cases pertaining to the availability of prohibition in double jeopardy
cases and concluded that issuing the writ in a proper case is the better view); quashed
on other grounds, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1976); State ex tel. James v. Williams, 164 So. 2d
873 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Wheeler v. Cooper, 157 So. 2d 875 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1963); State
ex tel. Hicks v. McCrary, 141 So. 2d 323 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1962).
29. State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd, 302 So. 2d 821 (1st D.C.A. 1974), modified,
310 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1975). In Rudd, however, the court did grant a writ of certiorari
based on the presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room. State v. Willard,
54 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1951).
30. FLA. STAT. §§914.04-.05 (1975).
31. Buchanan v. State ex tel. Husk, 167 So. 2d 38 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964), cert. denied,
174 So. 2d 742 (Fla.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954 (1965); State v. Newell, 102 So. 2d 613 (Fla.
1958); State v. Pearson, 68 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1953); State v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1951).
32. State ex tel. Gerstein v. Baker, 243 So. 2d 464 (3d D.C.A. 1971) (judge prohibited from summoning and impaneling a grand jury); State ex rel. Oldham v. Baker, 226
So. 2d 21 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1969) (judge prohibited from conducting in camera inspection
of grand jury testimony where no criminal case pending).
33. Vann Cott v. Driver, 243 So. 2d 457 (2d D.C.A. 1971), quashed, 257 So. 2d
541 (Fla. 1973). But see State ex tel. Rash v. Williams, 302 So. 2d 474 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974)
for the qualification that the unconstitutional statute must go to the fundamental jurisdiction of the court before prohibition will be invoked. Accord as to ordinance, Smith v.
Bettinghaus, 178 So. 2d 201 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965). See also Wehle & Belcher, supra note
1, at 551-52.
34. Wehle &,Belcher, supra note 1, at 552.
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finding that the affidavits filed in support of the motion for disqualification
are legally sufficient, the trial judge should relinquish jurisdiction. 35 However, the disqualified judge does have authority to enter an order transferring
the case to another judge. 3 1, In order to make a prima facie case in prohibition,
the affidavits must assert facts from which a conclusion of disqualification
may be reached.37 Further, in order for prohibition to lie, the judge whose
disqualification is sought must have been presented with a suggestion of disqualification accompanied by supporting data3 8 and compliance with the
other statutory requirements must be demonstrated.39
It is difficult to generalize about the type of showing which must be
made to establish prejudice. Potential bias has been found where litigants
had a law suit pending against the trial judge' 0 where the trial judge presiding over a bribery case was the alleged object of the bribery, 41 and
where counsel for defendant had previously actively campaigned for the
judge's impeachment.42 The following examples have been held to be insufficient to justify issuance of the writ: comments by the judge on posttrial, rather than trial matters, 43 mere comments by the judge concerning
his legal philosophical beliefs, 44 and the fact that the judge had passed the

legal retirement age.45 In a proper case, prohibition will issue to disqualify
persons, other than judges, sitting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. 46
In such instances the same standards relative to the disqualification of
judges will be applied.47
Prohibition has been rarely used to remedy improper venue. 48 However,

35. Brewton v. Kelly, 166 So. 2d 834 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
36. State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Wisehart, 120 So. 2d 810 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
37. State ex rel. Solomon v. Sloan, 234 So. 2d 697 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 239 So. 2d
267 (Fla. 1970).
38. State ex rel. Peebles v. Smith in and for Marion County, 291 So. 2d 102 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
39. State ex rel. Jensen v. Cannon, 163 So. 2d 535 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). See also FLA.
STAT. ch. 38 (1975).
40. Turner v. Cooper, 267 So. 2d 85 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
41. State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 113 So. 2d 218 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
42. State ex rel. Brewton v. Kelly, 166 So. 2d 834 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
43. State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe, 254 So. 2d 12 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
44. State ex rel. Gerstein v. Stedman, 233 So. 2d 142 (3d D.C.A.), cert. discharged,
238 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1970).
45. State ex rel. Booth v. Byington, 168 So. 2d 164 (Ist D.C.A. 1964), afJ'd, 178 So.
2d I (Fla. 1965) (quo warranto held to be the proper remedy for disqualifying a judge who
is over the maximum retirement age).
46. State ex rel. Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Broward County, 214 So. 2d
7 (4th D.C.A. 1968), cert. discharged, 219 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1969); cf. The Florida
Bar, 329 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1974), (prohibition inappropriate to challenge qualification of a
trial referee in disciplinary proceeding against attorney because referee lacked authority
to reach or implement a final decision).
47. State ex rel. Cannon v. Churchill, 195 So. 2d 599 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
48. See Wehle & Belcher, supra note 1, at 553. Most venue questions are decided by
means of interlocutory appeal, pursant to FLA Ap. R. 4.2.
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where the pleadings showed that the only proper venue lay in another county,
the writ of prohibition was issued.49
Contrary to prior case law, recent decisions have applied prohibition to
contempt matters.50 The inadequacy of habeas corpus as a remedy has been
noted. 51 It has been held that prohibition is an appropriate procedure to
invoke against a judge who is about to cite a party for contempt when the
party's action does not constitute contempt. 52 Prohibition is also properly
directed to a state agency threatening contempt. 53 Obviously, where the trial
court is acting within its jurisdiction, the writ will not issue,5 4 even though
the court may be exercising its valid jurisdiction erroneously. Jurisdiction to
act includes the power to err.55
While many judicial powers are inherent, the authority of the courts
to consider some matters is specifically conferred by statute. Where a court
derives its jurisdiction from a statute, prohibition is appropriate upon the
passage of a statute divesting such jurisdiction. 51 Similarly, when a statute
provides for an exclusive remedy in an administrative agency, the circuit
court is implicitly stripped of jurisdiction to entertain a suit on the same
subject matter that was formerly cognizable at common law. 57 If a jurisdictional basis is found to exist, prohibition will not lie to test the correctness
of the lower court order.58 Under extraordinary circumstances, a court of
equity has been held to have authority to entertain an action not regularly
within its jurisdiction where two other actions have resulted in an impasse. 59
A facet of the trial court's jurisdiction tested in recent prohibition cases
is the power of the court to restrict news coverage of judicial proceedings.
A so-called "gag" order has been prohibited in a criminal case "to the
extent that the order operates as a prior restraint upon constitutionally

49. State ex rel. McGreevy v. Dowling, 223 So. 2d 89 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); cf. Pitts v.
McCrary, 251 So. 2d 694 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1971) (suggestion was denied where defendant in
criminal case sought change of venue based on presence of prejudice and animosity in

community).
50. Wehle &Belcher, supra note 1, at 554.
51. State ex rel. Scussel v. Kelly, 152 So. 2d 767

(2d D.C.A. 1963), quashed, 167

So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1964) (the district court issued the writ but the supreme court disagreed,
holding that the suggestion was premature).
52. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So. 2d 896 (Ist D.C.A. 1970), cert. denied, 247 So. 2d
437 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Gillham v. Phillips, 193 So. 2d 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).

53. State ex rel. Greenberg v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 297 So. 2d 628 (Ist D.C.A.

1974), cert. discharged, 300 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1975).

54. State ex rel. Pearson v. Johnson, 334 So. 2d 54 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1976); Miller v.
Balikes, 166 So. 2d 610 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).

55. White v. State ex rel. Johnson, 160 Fla. 965, 37 So. 2d 580 (1948); State ex rel.
O'Donnell v. Hall, 175 So. 2d 792 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
56. Tobler v. Beckett, 297 So. 2d 59 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).

57. Winn-Lovett Tampa, Inc. v. Murphee, 73 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1954) (exclusive remedy
for workmen's compensation lies under Workmen's Compensation Act).
58. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitation Serv. v. Patten, 277 So. 2d 320 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (authority for circuit judge to enter special order in juvenile case

found in Rules of Juvenile Procedure).
59. Lewis v. Hodge, 254 So. 2d 397 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
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privileged publication or communication."60 Another free press issue raised
in the context of a prohibition proceeding contested the authority of a trial
court to conduct a closed dissolution of marriage proceeding. Of the two
cases rendered on the subject, one district court has granted relief 6l while
the other district court has upheld the trial court thereby permitting the
closed proceedings.62
Most defenses in a civil trial do not concern a court's jurisdiction; therefore prohibition is inappropriate. Not even res judicata, if successfully pleaded
and proved, divests a court of jurisdiction. 63 Sovereign immunity, however,
has been found to so fundamentally affect the jurisdiction of the court that
6
prohibition would lie. 4
While conceding that a trial court initially had jurisdiction, the question
sometimes arises whether that jurisdiction has been lost. The general rule
is that even though no appeal has been taken, trial courts have authority over
their own orders and judgments and can vacate, amend, or reform them only
in the manner and within the time provided by rule or statute., 5 Where no
rule or statute is violated, a trial court has been held to have the power,
even after final judgment has been satisfied, to enter a stay of execution order
to permit an appeal.6 6 However, once the appellate court has issued its
mandate following an appeal, a trial court's attempt to review its decision
is without authority and may be prohibited. 6T
Prohibition is also applicable to administrative bodies which render
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.68 The rules of prohibition applicable to
courts appear to be identical for administrative agencies. 69
60. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1972); see also State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904
(Fla. 1977) reversing 320 So. 2d 861 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975). Relator had filed for prohibition
in the supreme court which denied relief but decided to treat the petition as one for
conflict certiorari, 322 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975).
61. State ex rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Lyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
62. State ex rel. English v. McCray, 328 So. 2d 257 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1976) (petition
for certiorari filed in supreme court March 9, 1976).
63. State ex rel. Paluska v. White, 162 So. 2d 697 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
64. Department of Natural Resources v. Circuit Court, 317 So. 2d 772 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1975). See also State Road Dept. v. Taylor, 167 So. 2d 748 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (sovereign
immunity was raised in prohibition action but was dismissed because copy of complaint
not attached to suggestion).
65. Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965). See also Shelby Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel. Huntley Bros., Inc. v. Gooding, 149
So. 2d 55 (1st D.C.A.), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1963) (after 10 days for
rehearing passed, trial court lost jurisdiction); State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 149 So. 2d 552
(Fla. 1962) (after statutory period for notice of probate expired, order of probate became
conclusive).
66. Chapman v. Rose, 295 So. 2d 667 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
67. King v. L & L Investors, Inc., 136 So. 2d 671 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). But see Avant v.
Waites, 295 So. 2d 362 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974) (holding that a trial court has post-mandate
jurisdiction to entertain a motion pursuant to FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)).
68. Grissom v. State ex rel. Stephenson, 104 So. 2d 55 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
69. State v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974) (remedy at law must be inadequate); State
v. Boyd, 114 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1959) (prohibition preventative rather than corrective remedy).
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An appellate court, too, may lack jurisdiction, thereby making prohibition
in a superior court a proper remedy. For instance, the filing of an untimely
notice of appeal does not vest jurisdiction in the appellate court and review
by such court will be prohibited. 70 Nor may the appellate court review an
interlocutory order which is not appealable. 71 So long as the notice of appeal
is timely filed, mere defects associated with the notice will not act to destroy
appellate jurisdiction.72 Even a notice of appeal which is prematurely filed
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court where the notice
is filed subsequent to the oral judgment of the court but prior to the written
73
final judgment.
Prohibition is generally said to lie only to challenge subject matter rather
than personal jurisdiction. 7 4 However, two courts have held that prohibition
is a proper remedy when a court attempts to impose its jurisdiction upon a
75
party over whom it has no authority.
PROCFURE

The procedure for seeking a writ of prohibition may be found in the
Florida Appellate Rules7 6 and in the Florida Statutes. 77 Given the extraordinary nature of the remedy, the courts generally act swiftly in prohibition
cases. In the supreme court, procedure has changed drastically.78 According
to Sid J. White, Clerk of the Supreme Court, as soon as a suggestion is filed
and docketed, it is assigned, usually within one day of filing, to a five-member
panel.79 If the panel determines that the suggestion establishes a prima facie
case, it will issue a rule directing the lower court to show cause, usually within
ten days, why the writ should not issue. 0 If the court decides that oral argument would be helpful, it directs the Clerk to set the case for hearing on
the next motion day after all briefs are filed.8 ' The relator is permitted not
70. State ex rel. Sebers v. McNulty, 326 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1975); State v. Smith, 160
So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1964).
71. State v. Pierce, 269 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1972).
72. State ex rel. Shevin v. Rawls, 290 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1974) (notice of appeal timely
filed but in wrong district); State v. Carroll, 151 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1963) (defendant, rather
than plaintiff, erroneously designated as appellant in notice of appeal); State ex rel. Moore
v. Murphree, 106 So. 2d 430 (Ist D.C.A.), cert. denied, 108 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1958) (filing
fee deposited in incorrect amount). See also Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975).
73. See State ex rel. Shevin v. Rawls, 326 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1976) which cites as
controlling Williams v. State, 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975).
74. State v. Herin, 80 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1955); State v. Shields, 83 So. 2d 271 (Fla.
1955); State ex rel. Ferre v. Kehoe, 179 So. 2d 403 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
75. Rehrer v. Weeks, 106 So. 2d 865 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See also State ex tel. O'Dare v.
Kehoe, 189 So. 2d 268 (3d D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1967).
76. FLA. App. R. 4.5(a)2(d). The Florida Appellate Rules are currently being revised,
but, as of the publication date of this article, the process of revision has not been completed.
Thus, it is impossible to predict any change in procedure.
77. FLA. STAT. §§81.011 et seq. (1975).
78. Wehle & Belcher, supra note 1, at 544.
79. Letter from Sid J. White to Judge Tyrie A. Boyer (April 12, 1976).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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more than ten days to file a reply brief.8 2 The cause is then either set for hearing
or returned to the court for final disposition.8 3
Procedure in the four district courts of appeal follow, of course, the applicable appellate rules, but the internal procedures may slightly vary. It is
thought that the procedure employed by the first district, as described by
Clerk Raymond E. Rhodes, 8 4 is typical. According to Mr. Rhodes, the
suggestion for writ of prohibition, which is to be supported by a brief at the
time of filing, is immediately taken to the Chief Judge and assigned to a
three judge panel. If it is determined that the suggestion makes out a prima
facie case, a rule nisi is issued, generally giving the respondent 10 days to
respond thereto.85 If the court determines that oral argument would be desirable, the cause is set to be heard, usually on the next motion day, although
special hearings are utilized in rare instances.8 6
Practice in the circuit court varies slightly but in general closely follows
the relevant statutory and appellate rules.
Care should be taken in complying with the technical rules of prohibition.
8
Suggestions have been denied because the proper party was not joined, T
and because of a failure to provide the reviewing court with a sufficient
record.88 Choosing a receptive forum is also important, because the supreme
court has ruled that it will not grant relief in a second prohibition action
where another appellate court has previously denied the original suggestion.8 9
Prohibition should initially be filed in the superior court having immediate
appellate jurisdiction over the inferior court. 90
CONCLUSION

This article has been approached with trepidation. As one court observed
some 10 years ago, "No single statement of the general principles governing
the issuance of the writ of prohibition can be made that will not be at
variance with some decisions on the subject." 91 Nevertheless, an effort has
been made to discern the contexts within which prohibition may be employed,
and the directions toward which the use of the writ is moving.
While the nature and scope have remained relatively stable over the

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Letter from Raymond E. Rhodes to Judge Tyrie A. Boyer (April 7, 1976).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Eagan v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 217 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1968); State v. Gordon,
107 So. 2d 401 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
88. Pettie v. Kronberg, 300 So. 2d 44 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State ex rel. Roose v.
Vordermeier, 209 So. 2d 685 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
89. State ex rel. Kovnot v. Ferguson, 313 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1975).
90. State ex rel. Brewer v. Pettie, 294 So. 2d 120 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Johnston
v. State ex rel. Carter, 213 So. 2d 435 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968); State ex rel. Fla. Real Estate
Comm'n v. Anderson, 164 So. 2d 265 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. State ex rel. Bradley, 155 So. 2d 393 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
91. Smith v. Bettinghaus, 178 So. 2d 201 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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past 25 years, there are potential subjects for growth: 92 but so long as the focus
remains on jurisdiction, the expansion of prohibition into new areas will
probably be slow. Consequently, given the narrow scope of the writ, the
estimate that not over 10 percent of practicing lawyers in Florida will encounter prohibition in a lifetime of practice93 is still viable today.
92. See text accompanying notes 59-61, 74 supra.
93. Wehle & Belcher, supra note 1, at 546.
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